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ABSTRACT 
 
MEASURING THE FINANCIAL EFFICIENCY OF PPP TOLL ROAD 
PROJECTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: A DEA ANALYSIS 
 
By 
Hyeri Byun 
 Analysis has been performed to document success and failure factors of the Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) market in Korea to assist in establishing effective PPP policy. 
Since it is difficult to define success or failure based on one dependent variable or output, 
and to make identification of objective relationships between multiple inputs and outputs 
possible, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has been used to measure the success of 
PPP road projects in Korea. The most significant difference setting this work apart from 
other papers using DEA is a focus on the financial aspects of PPP projects instead of the 
governmental perspective, viewing PPP projects as a type of Project Financing (PF) 
investment.  
In this study, an input-oriented Banker, Chames and Cooper (BCC) model was used 
for analysis, and the input and output factors for DEA were as follows: input factors 
included operating cost, Amortization of Management and Operation Rights (AMOR), 
and interest expense, while output factors consisted of Cash Flow from Operating 
Activities (CFOA), traffic volume (annual average daily traffic), and sales. 
Overall findings show that projects with a high efficiency score are characterized 
by a medium input level with a high level of output, and projects in the Seoul 
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metropolitan area or those receiving a higher ratio of MRG to sales tended to receive 
higher efficiency scores. Policy implications are as follows: The government needs to 
estimate traffic volume more carefully and thoroughly, especially when proceeding with 
new projects in local areas or non-Seoul metropolitan areas through the use of a 
periodical monitoring system for demand while also tightening up internal supervision 
over the authority in charge. Also, the government would do well to make a continuous 
effort to reduce the fiscal burden by altering the subsidy payment mechanism from MRG 
to MCC. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
The Private-Public Partnership (PPP) market in Korea has existed for about 20 
years and is now entering a mature phase. However, evaluations of the PPP system and 
market are mixed, with both positive and negative assessments. Hence, it is warranted at 
this point to explore the current system to document success and failure factors by 
conducting a rigorous study to assist in establishing effective PPP policy, with the Korean 
system and market as a benchmark.   
The most significant aspect differentiating this paper from others using Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a focus on the financial aspects of PPP projects 
themselves instead of prioritizing the governmental point of view, approaching PPP 
projects as Project Financing (PF) investments.  
Among numerous factors that influence success or failure, the location of projects 
(affecting demand), type of road (highly related to construction cost), and revenue 
subsidies (directly increasing sales) were chosen to improve the observation of effects. 
To be specific, three hypotheses were defined. First, Seoul metropolitan area projects 
were anticipated to be more efficient than those in non-Seoul metropolitan areas. Second, 
main road projects were anticipated to be more efficient than tunnel/bridge projects. 
Third, projects with Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) payments were anticipated to 
be more efficient than projects without. 
The primary purpose of this paper is to report the results of a quantitative study 
using DEA from a financial perspective to assess PPP road projects in the Republic of 
Korea. DEA was used since it offers a method to measure relative efficiency by 
estimating a producible set and boundary based on input and output data for each 
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Decision Making Unit (DMU) when multiple input and output factors exist. Calculating a 
relative efficiency score using several output factors was an attractive approach because it 
is otherwise difficult to identify objective relationships between inputs and outputs, given 
the challenge of characterizing production and unsuitability of parametric efficiency 
analysis for discussing the efficiency of the production function. On the other hand, DEA 
lacks the advantages of a functional method since it is not true that any assumption can be 
statistically validated and the relationship between inputs and outputs does not 
necessarily follow the form of a function. Nonetheless, the strengths were deemed to 
outweigh these drawbacks for the context of this study. 
This paper is composed of four parts: Firstly, the PPP system in the Republic of 
Korea is examined and a literature review on success factors is presented. Secondly, DEA 
methodology is examined. After that, the results of a DEA assessment of each project are 
reported. The final section presents findings and discussion related to success factors and 
suggests a direction for future PPP policy. 
Ⅱ. Theoretical Study and Literature Review 
2.1 Overview of the PPP System in the Republic of Korea 
1) Legal Framework for PPP 
After the enactment of the Act on Promotion of Private Capital Investment in 
Social Overhead Capital in 1994, intended to induce an influx of private capital to build 
infrastructure facilities, the legal framework of the PPP system in the Republic of Korea 
was reformed and evolved to become more sophisticated and better promote PPP markets. 
The current hierarchy of legal arrangements for the PPP system is as follows: 1) the Act 
on Public-Private Partnerships in infrastructure (PPP Act), 2) presidential decrees such as 
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the Enforcement Decree of the PPP Act, 3) the Basic Plan for PPP Projects by the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, and 4) guidelines for the implementation of PPP 
projects by the Korea Development Institution (KDI). 
2) Eligible Types of PPP Projects 
Under the current legal system, Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), Build-Transfer-
Lease (BTL), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), and Build-Own-Operate (BOO) are 
possible structures. Among PPP types, BTO and BTL are most common in the Republic 
of Korea. According to Article 3 of the Basic Plan for PPP Projects (2016), PPP types are 
defined as follows. 
Table 1 
Public–Private Partnership Types in the Republic of Korea 
 
A PPP project may be implemented in any of the following forms pursuant to Article 
4 of the Act:  
1. BTO (Build-Transfer-Operate): A type of arrangement in which the ownership of 
an infrastructure facility vests in the central government or a local government 
upon completion (new establishment, enlargement, or improvement) of the facility, 
while the concessionaire is granted the right to manage and operate the facility for 
a specified period; 
2. BTL (Build-Transfer-Lease): A type of arrangement in which the ownership of an 
infrastructure facility vests in the central government or a local government upon 
completion (new establishment, enlargement, or improvement) of the facility, 
while the concessionaire is granted the right to manage and operate the facility for 
a specified period, but the central government or local government leases the 
facility for the period stipulated in the concession agreement to use and benefit 
from the facility; 
3. BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer): A type of arrangement in which the ownership of 
an infrastructure facility belongs to the concessionaire during a specified period 
after completion; 
4. BOO (Build-Own-Operate): A type of arrangement in which the ownership of an 
infrastructure facility vests in the concessionaire upon completion (new 
establishment, enlargement, or improvement) of the facility.  
 
 
Source: the Article 3 of the Basic Plan for PPP. Retrieved from http://www.pimac.kdi.re.kr 
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BTO arrangements are normally implemented for profitable projects such as toll 
roads and railroads, characterized by high risk and high return. On the other hand, non-
profitable projects such as schools and hospitals apply a BTL arrangement, for low risk 
and low return. 
In addition, BTO-rs and BTO-a arrangements were introduced in 2016. These share 
investment and demand risk between governments and the private sector in order to 
promote public interest by mitigating the fiscal burden and adjusting user fees. These two 
types are suitable for medium risk and medium return compared with BTO and BTL.  
3) Payment Mechanisms 
Unlike the payment mechanisms used in other countries, such as a shadow toll or 
availability payments for road projects, the Republic of Korea has a unique system. 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) payments are mostly adopted in developing 
countries to attract private investors, while on the other hand, Minimum Cost 
Compensation (MCC) payments are similar to availability payment mechanisms but 
place less focus on the availability of the facility. 
a) Minimum Revenue Guarantee Payments 
Among the arrangements mentioned above, the private sector or a developer 
assumes the demand risk for BTO projects, while the public sector takes responsibility 
for demand risk in BTL projects by making lease payments to the private sector. 
However, to attract private investors, the Republic of Korea offered MRGs for BTO PPP 
projects with contracts signed from January 1999 to October 2009. The government made 
payments to contractors if project revenue fell below certain levels, as clarified on the 
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implementation agreement. Conversely, if revenue exceeded an upper bound, the excess 
was shared between the private investor and the government. 
As of the end of 2008, about 1,390.3 billion KRW in MRG subsidies had been paid 
to private project companies. Early projects started operation but generated only 50% of 
expected demand on average. Many government payments were provided as MRG 
subsidies annually. (Kim et al., 2011) 
One criticism of the MRG system was that the government took most of the risk, 
while providing unreasonably high returns to private participants. Higher MRG levels 
implied more risk transfer from private participants to the government. Another criticism 
was that the project company may display morally hazardous behavior, losing motivation 
to increase revenue since it did not bear the bulk of the risk. (Kim et al., 2011) 
In an October 2009 revision of the PPP Basic Plan, the government abolished the 
MRG scheme.(Kim et al., 2011) However, projects with an implementation agreement 
dated before 2009 still received MRG payments from the government.  
b) Minimum Cost Compensation Payments 
According to the Basic Plan (2016), ongoing BTO projects can change their 
implementation conditions such as risk sharing methods and toll rate decisions given 
excessive fiscal burdens due to MRG payments or expected termination due to operation 
loss. In this situation, MRG payments could be changed to MCC. 
MCC helps maintain the BTO scheme in which private investment costs are 
recouped through user fees paid by infrastructure/facility users while private investment 
costs and minimum opportunity costs in excess of user fee revenue are compensated by a 
relevant authority. This scheme reduces investment risk while keeping the BTO model’s 
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purpose and operation mechanism intact. MCC ensures a project company can recoup 
private investment costs not covered by user fee revenue in a stable manner while easing 
the government’s payment burden by lowering the rate of return compared to 
MRG.(APEC, 2014) 
2.2 Performance Evaluation of PPP Projects 
Many authors have attempted to evaluate the success of PPP projects by such 
means as Key Performance Indicators (Mladenovic, Vajdic, Wundsch, and Temeljotov-
Salaj, 2013; Yuan, Zeng, Skibniewski, and Li,2009), Critical Success Factors (Walter and 
Scholz, 2007; Zhang, 2005), and by assessing value for money aspects (Burger and 
Hawkesworth,2011; Grimsey and Lewis, 2005; Nisar, 2007), but no single methodology 
for assessment has been widely accepted as the best due to the contextual complexity of 
construction projects. It appears that insufficient research has been undertaken on the 
success or failure of PPPs to date; there is a serious need for a rigorous assessment of 
PPPs. (Liyanage and Villalba-Romero,2015) 
In the Republic of Korea as well, strong, in-depth quantitative evaluations of PPP 
projects have been sparse, especially in the academic field. Earlier studies focused on 
certain areas such as risk management, inducement for project financing, and policy 
design and direction.  
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport has been conducting an annual 
operation assessment of PPP roads since 2011. However, this review is weighted towards 
satisfying users and public support rather than considering Special Purpose Company’s 
(SPC) profitability and financial stability. Service quality for public facilities is also very 
important from the government’s perspective, but private investors consider profitability 
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and financial stability to be the most crucial factors influencing their decisions to invest 
in PPP projects. Regarding the establishment of the PPP system, it was first introduced in 
the Republic of Korea to promote private capital investment in SOC, solving the SOC 
budget deficit to enable Korea’s economy to develop more rapidly. Even though high 
profitability and financial stability are the first prerequisites for investment in SPC, the 
Korean government often disregards this fact. Furthermore, the government tends to have 
a negative view of SPC’s high profitability because it considers high profitability to be 
possible only when excessive profit levels are supported through minimum revenue 
guarantees. 
A recent study by KDI completed in 2017 involved Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) and DEA, using financial factors to assess the performance of PPP road 
projects. This attempt was path-breaking but insufficient to explain the success factors of 
top-ranked projects and failure factors of SPC ranked at the bottom.  
2.3 DEA for Road Projects 
The DEA method for measuring the relative efficiency of a set of similar DMUs 
was originally presented by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes. The model determines, for 
each DMU, a set of virtual multipliers or factor weights such that the ratio of weighted 
outputs to weighted inputs for the DMU in question is maximized. This ratio becomes the 
DMU's relative efficiency measure (Cook, W. D., Roll, Y., and Kazakov, A. 1990).  
Studies have been done with various focuses such as hospitals, schools, ports, 
banks, and roads to adopt the DEA method to assess performance over the past few years. 
By 1990, DEA was becoming fully developed, and significant advances had been made 
on all fronts: models, extensions, computation, and practice (Seiford, L. M. 1996). 
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Research by Cook et al. (1990) applied DEA to measure the efficiency of highway 
maintenance, accommodating multiple inputs and outputs and ranking orders patrols. 
Rouse and Putterill (2005) expanded on previous studies by comparing efficiency before 
and after local government amalgamation (Shin and Kim, 2009). Shin and Kim (2009) 
adopted the DEA method to evaluate the construction, operation, and profit efficiency of 
4 PPP road projects and 15 public road projects. The public projects presented higher 
construction and operation efficiency. 
Meanwhile, in Shin’s 2009 study, PPP projects presented higher profit efficiency 
simply due to imposing higher tolls. Similar research has been done subsequently, but no 
in-depth analysis or suggestions have been offered because existing studies did not fully 
consider the differences between PPP and public projects and simply compared them 
from a public perspective. Public projects have the disadvantage of project delays due to 
limited budgets, inefficient procedures, and expected cost increases, but the PPP system 
has been introduced to solve this. PPP projects progress in a timely manner within budget, 
but investors pursue certain rates of return, which makes PPP project costs higher than 
for public projects. Therefore, it could be more meaningful to measure efficiency and 
find implications among PPP projects than to conduct a simple comparison between 
public and PPP projects.  
Ⅲ. Methodology 
3.1 Method for Measurement of Efficiency 
There are several ways to measure efficiency quantitatively: ratio analysis, the 
productivity index method, a functional approach (regression analysis), and non-
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parametric frontier estimation are the most commonly used, representative options. DEA 
is included in non-parametric frontier estimation. 
1) Ratio Analysis 
Ratio analysis is an analytical method that is useful for evaluating the financial and 
business performance of a company because it offers a relatively easy way to measure 
efficiency. Ratios are applied in various ways, such as financial ratios, cost-benefit 
analysis, and cost-effectiveness analysis, with each step based on single or multiple ratios 
that can be compared. This type of ratio analysis uses financial statements to calculate 
financial ratios that can explain the economic situation of the company, allowing for 
comparison with ratios representing a company’s own standard or the industry standard 
to evaluate profitability, liquidity, stability, and growth potential (Park, 2008). 
2) Productivity Index Method 
The productivity of a firm is defined as the ratio of input factors to output factors. 
Productivity is measured as the total productivity of the index type, productivity of each 
factor such as labor and capital, and total factor productivity. For total productivity, the 
ratio of total inputs to outputs offers an easy way to measure the overall efficiency of a 
firm, while factor productivity is useful for measuring productivity based on inputs. Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) is useful from an economic point of view since productivity is 
measured in terms of added value. 
This total productivity index method has an advantage in that it can easily provide 
information on production management to companies, but there are also several 
disadvantages. First, with this method productivity is calculated by converting output and 
input factors into amounts to determine nominal productivity. In this process, distortion 
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of real production may occur. Second, it is not easy to identify what part of an enterprise 
is inefficient with the information provided. Therefore, it is difficult to substantially 
improve the productivity and efficiency of an enterprise using the results of the total 
productivity index method. 
3) Functional Approach (Regression Analysis) 
The functional approach measures efficiency by comparing the level of actual 
output to the level of expected output, assuming that the output of a company is 
determined by the input level. If the actual output level using a given input element is 
below expectations, then efficiency is considered to be low for the company. 
The functional approach is essentially parametric. That is, the function formula for 
the output produced using an input element should be assumed. Regression analysis is 
one method of determining whether independent and dependent variables are correlated 
and how independent variables change dependent variables. 
Regression models include random errors for output and input variables, which are 
assumed to reflect inefficiency. However, separating inefficiency from the error term is 
not an easy process and requires strong assumptions about the distribution of 
inefficiencies (Kim, 2006). Nonetheless, regression analysis can be used to estimate the 
efficiency of a company producing a single output by entering the number of input 
factors used while controlling the size and range of the industry. 
However, regression analysis has the following limitations. First, since regression 
analysis assumes a single function formula, output should be a single item, so it is not a 
suitable method of analysis for a company producing a large number of outputs. Second, 
regression analysis is an analytical method that measures the relative efficiency of a firm 
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by comparing average performance with the least squares method. It is difficult to obtain 
ideal efficiency with this approach. Third, even in the same function model, output units 
may be different or the result may be distorted due to price effects when converting 
output prices. 
4) Non-parametric Frontier Approach (DEA) 
The functional method discussed above is a stochastic approach to measuring 
efficiency by estimating the empirical cost or production frontier from observed data, 
which is a traditional efficiency analysis method that estimates the parameters of the 
production or cost function. This is the method preferred by most economists, where the 
form of the production function, such as the isoquant curve, is known or statistically 
estimable. 
An advantage of the functional method is that any assumption can be statistically 
validated and the relationship between inputs and outputs follows the form of a function. 
However, when an accurate cost function for the public or service sectors cannot be 
easily derived, or if it is difficult to identify an objective relationship between inputs and 
outputs, it becomes hard to characterize production and inappropriate to discuss the 
efficiency of the production function. 
Because of the limitations of this traditional efficiency analysis method, a non-
parametric approach should be used to measure the efficiency of industries with few 
assumptions and constraints, and multiple inputs and outputs. The DEA model was 
proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) based on the concept of efficiency 
defined by Farrell (1957). The DEA model is a linear planning methodology designed to 
measure the relative efficiency of DMUs that perform similar types of management 
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activities, using data on multiple inputs and outputs. It is a frontier approach that 
evaluates efficiency by specifying a best practice unit and then comparing this with other 
DMUs. 
3.2 DEA Model 
1) Properties of DEA 
Since the DEA analysis method first appeared, it has been used for efficiency 
analyses in various fields. The DEA model is used to find benchmarking DMUs1 to 
improve the efficiency of inefficient DMUs. 
The original idea behind DEA was to provide a methodology whereby, within a set 
of comparable DMUs, those exhibiting best practice could be identified and would form 
an efficient frontier. Furthermore, this methodology enables one to measure the level of 
efficiency of non-frontier units and to identify benchmarks against which such inefficient 
units can be compared (Wade D. Cook et al., 2009). 
DEA can be used to measure relative efficiency by estimating a producible set and 
a boundary based on input and output data for each DMU when there are multiple input 
and output factors. DEA has the disadvantage that it cannot be used to estimate the direct 
effect of DMUs, but it is accepted as an attractive analysis framework given that results 
are relatively easy to interpret and are convincing (Kim, 2011). The advantages of DEA 
will be examined in detail below. 
First, DEA does not presume the weights for input and output data in advance.  
                                                          
1A Decision Making Unit (DMU) is considered to be technically efficient if, from the basket of inputs it 
holds, it produces the maximum outputs possible or if, to produce a given quantity of outputs, it uses the 
smallest quantity of inputs possible (Atkinson and Cornwell, 1994). 
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The stochastic frontier approach, or non-frontier approach, measures performance by 
taking a weighted average score of indicators after assigning weights in advance 
according to the relative importance of the indicators. However, in this process, 
weighting by relative importance can be influenced by evaluator subjectivity. On the 
other hand, the weight of input and output elements for DEA is obtained from 
benchmarking DMUs, thus ensuring objectivity in performance measurement and 
evaluation (Kim and Choi, 2005). 
Secondly, if a specific production function is unknown or difficult to describe due 
to multiple input and output factors, it is possible to compare the efficiency of a particular 
DMU with other similar DMUs, indicating the relative degree of efficiency (Kim and Choi, 
2005). Therefore, DEA is useful for evaluating nonprofits or public agencies that have 
multiple inputs and outputs and whose production function is unknown. 
Third, DEA can allow for the development of a management strategy to improve 
efficiency if the DEA model includes controllable inputs (Jung and Kang, 2006). Each 
organization can work toward improving its efficiency by seeking management strategies 
for input and output elements using efficiency frontier information obtained through 
DEA. 
Meanwhile, according to Ko (2017), the disadvantages of DEA are as follows. If all 
DMUs have the same efficiency rating due to inefficiency inherent in the whole 
organization being analyzed, DEA will be useless (Ko, 2017). Next, depending on how 
inputs and outputs are selected, efficiency measurement results may vary (Ko, 2017). 
Third, DEA offers a good way to measure relative efficiency, but absolute efficiency 
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cannot be measured. Finally, as a non-parametric method, the statistical test involved is 
difficult to complete (Ko, 2017). 
Ⅳ. Analysis 
4.1 DEA Models (BCC, Input Oriented) 
The most widely used DEA models are the CCR and BCC models. The CCR model 
was named after Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes who introduced the technique, and the 
BCC model was named after Banker, Charnes and Cooper. The difference between these 
two models lies in the assumptions used to define the producible set or efficiency 
boundary. When determining a producible set, the CCR model assumes free disposability, 
convexity, and constant returns to scale; the BCC model assumes free disposability, 
convexity, and variable returns to scale. For this analysis, a BCC model was used. Since 
economies of scale can exist, it was necessary to mitigate the assumption of constant 
returns to scale. 
When addressing a realistic problem, whether to select an input-oriented or output-
oriented approach must be considered. An input-oriented model assumes that input 
factors can be controlled. Therefore, if target output is given, an input-oriented model is 
appropriate since input can be managed to achieve efficiency. An output-oriented model, 
on the other hand, is appropriate when efficiency is to be achieved by adjusting the output 
from a given input. 
 Input and output directions for the CCR and BCC models can be set, and 
multiplier and envelopment models can be used. Using the multiplier model, efficiency 
priorities among DMUs can be determined. It is also easy to conclude how input and 
output elements should be weighted to achieve optimal efficiency. The envelopment 
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model provides the same results as the multiplier model but gives more information for 
interpreting the results. It is widely used, especially in judging strong and weak levels of 
efficiency and in reference DMU analysis. In DEA, the envelopment model is more 
general than the multiplier model. The reason DEA is referred to as a data envelopment 
model is that it calculates efficiency from the perspective of an envelopment model. 
In the case of efficiency for a road project, since output is dependent on input and 
SPC has discretion over financial resources, the input-oriented model is reasonable. 
Therefore, in this study, an input-oriented BCC model has been used for analysis.  
Input-oriented envelopment analysis can be said to offer "a model that finds a ratio 
 where all input factors are reduced to minimize the input level, while achieving at least 
the same level of output."  
When applying the linear programming method, an efficiency boundary using 
linear combinations for the input factor ( ) and the output element ( ) are 
created. Next, constrains are imposed so DMU outputs are smaller than or equal to the 
outputs of the efficiency boundary, while DMU inputs are greater than or equal to the 
inputs of the efficiency boundary. Input-oriented models are based on the logic that the 
value that minimizes the distance from the efficiency boundary should become the 
efficiency score. 
The relevant linear programming objective function and constraints for input-
oriented BCC envelopment analysis are below. 
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Figure 1 
Index for Input-Oriented BCC Envelopment Analysis Model 
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Figure 2 
Input-Oriented BCC Envelopment Analysis 
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4.2 Input and Output Factors 
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input factor for operating and maintenance efficiency analysis, but Amortization of 
Management and Operation Rights (AMOR, a period cost of construction cost) and 
interest expense (financing cost) are also included for this analysis. On the other hand, 
sales and values related to SPC’s profit such as Cash Flow from Operating Activities 
(CFOA, a major consideration for lenders) and traffic volume have been chosen as output 
factors. 
However, MRG funds were excluded because they result from policy rather than 
efficiency of the project itself. Finally, three input and three output factors were chosen 
for analysis.  
- Input Factors: Operating cost, Amortization of Management and Operation Rights 
(AMOR), interest expense 
- Output Factors: Cash Flow from Operating Activities (CFOA), traffic volume, 
sales 
1) Input Factors 
The costs incurred by SPC can be divided into three categories. Explained simply, 
operational costs are incurred when operating. Since operation expenses in the published 
audit report include the Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) and Selling, General and 
Administrative (SGA) expenses, the summed value of these two costs was chosen as the 
first input factor. However, AMOR as a non-cash expense accounts for the largest portion 
of operating expenses. Amortization expense is the cost of amortizing total private 
investment costs for construction using mostly a straight-line method every year during 
the operation period. However, it is not incurred from operation itself, so it has been 
excluded from operating cost. 
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However, total private investment costs are also expenses for construction of 
facilities, so AMOR, which is a related annualized cost, should be considered a cost 
associated with generating profit. If amortization methods had differed for each company, 
the efficiency value may have been greatly affected, but almost all SPCs amortize 
intangible assets using a straight-line method over the operating period. Therefore, this 
value was included as an input factor serving as a proxy for construction cost. 
Meanwhile, as a kind of PF project, PPP projects have a very high debt ratio (debt 
accounts for 80-90% of total investment), which causes high interest costs. Considering 
financing aspects such as payable conditions or the possibility of insolvency is very 
important when measuring the efficiency of SPCs. 
2) Output Factors  
Output factors included CFOA, traffic volume, and sales. Revenue was included as 
the most basic output. On the other hand, revenue from MRG was excluded from sales. 
Including MRG could distort the perceived efficiency of a project since it represents a 
grant for projects established before 2007, irrespective of the efficiency of the project 
itself. 
In addition, CFOA was chosen to assess whether SPCs could repay principle and 
interest payments with net operating cash flow. Because it is difficult to obtain Earnings 
Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) from published data, 
CFOA from the cash flow statement within the published audit report was used. CFOA is 
a cash balance that excludes cash operating expenses from revenue, excluding MRG, and 
can be useful to indicate whether principal and interest payments can be redeemed with 
cash. Finally, the traffic volume representing how many users access a facility per day 
20 
 
was necessary for determining the performance of projects as a complement of sales. 
4.3 Data and Analysis Method  
In a DEA model, the total number of input and output variables and the total 
number of DMUs to be evaluated are related. In other words, if the number of selected 
variables is larger than the number of DMUs, then the discriminative power of the model 
to distinguish between efficient and inefficient units is greatly reduced. In empirical 
general principles, the total number of DMUs must be greater than the number of input 
and output factors. In order to compare highway construction efficiency, maintenance 
efficiency and profitability under theoretical and empirical assumptions, a total of 35 
projects for which public data was available among 37 PPP roads in operation in 2016 
were selected. Roads composed of only tunnels and bridges were divided into different 
groups because of differences with general roads, such as road length and construction 
cost. The samples included 13 tunnels and bridges, and 22 main roads. 
Table 2 
Number of PPP Roads in Operation as of 2016 
Operation starting year Project No. 
2000 1 
2001 2 
2002 4 
2003 - 
2004 4 
2005 1 
2006 3 
2007 1 
2008 3 
2009 4 
2010 2 
2011 2 
2012 - 
2013 4 
2014 2 
2015 1 
2016 3 
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Total 37 
Source: PIMAC Infra info DB   
Among the above projects, 27 have MRG provisions, with 10 of these provisions 
since abolished, 6 MRG provisions remaining but not paid, and 11 paid. 
Table 3 
PPP Roads in Operation as of 2016 
(unit: million KRW)  
Type Projects (DMU name) Total private investment cost 
Operation 
started Size (km) 
Operating 
years 
B
rid
ge
/T
un
ne
l 
Bukhang I'Bridge Co., Ltd. 
(Busan) 500,357 2014 3.30 30 
Eulsukdo Bridge Co., Ltd. 
(Busan) 443,071 2010 5.20 30 
GK Fixed Link Corp. (Busan-
Geoje) 1,952,327 2011 8.20 40 
Ilsan Grand Bridge Corporation 210,490 2008 1.80 30 
Incheon Bridge Co., Ltd. 1,539,177 2009 12.30 30 
Machang Bridge Corp. 368,375 2008 1.70 30 
Manwolsan Tunnel Co., Ltd. 
(Incheon) 124,004 2005 2.90 30 
Mishiryung Area Development 
Co., Ltd. 113,530 2006 15.70 30 
Mun Hack Development Co., Ltd. 
(Incheon) 66,645 2002 1.50 20 
The Ulsan Harbour Bridge Co., 
Ltd. 441,877 2015 8.40 30 
Wonjecksan Tunnel Inc. 84,303 2004 2.30 30 
Woomyunsan Development Co., 
Ltd. (Tunnel) 163,183 2004 3.00 30 
Yongma Tunnel Co., Ltd. 176,606 2014 3.60 30 
M
ai
n 
R
oa
d 
Busan Ulsan Expressway Co., 
Ltd. 1,260,623 2008 47.20 30 
CheonanNonsan Expressway Co., 
Ltd. 1,538,378 2002 81.00 30 
Daegu East Circulation Road Co., 
Ltd. 161,205 2002 7.30 24 
Daegu South Circulation Road 
Corporation 387,928 2013 10.40 26 
Daejeon Riverside Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 120,135 2004 4.90 30 
Gwangju Belt-Highway Inc. 
(Section 4) 191,547 2007 4.50 30 
Gyeonggi Highway Co., Ltd. 
(West Suwon- Pyeongtaek) 1,035,573 2009 38.50 30 
GYEONGSU Highway Co., Ltd. 
(YongIn- Seoul) 993,855 2009 22.90 30 
Kangnam Beltway Co., Ltd. 1,203,369 2016 12.40 30 
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(Seoul) 
Kwangju Ring Road Co., Ltd. 
(Section 3) 144,323 2004 3.50 30 
Kwangju Ring Road Co., Ltd. 
(Section 1) 175,084 2001 5.70 28 
Kyunggi South Road Co., Ltd. 353,885 2013 13.10 29 
Metropolitan Western 
Expressway Co., Ltd. 1,287,165 2016 27.40 30 
Namyangju Urban Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 227,938 2011 11.20 30 
New Airport Highway Co., Ltd. 
(Incheon) 1,425,110 2001 40.20 30 
New Daegu Busan Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 2,332,278 2006 82.10 30 
Seoul Beltway Corp. 1,339,533 2006 36.30 30 
Seoul-Chuncheon Highway Co., 
Ltd. 1,742,343 2009 61.40 30 
The 2nd Seohaean Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 844,121 2013 42.60 30 
The 2nd Youngdong Highway 
Co., Ltd. (Seoul-Wonju) 1,137,893 2016 57.00 30 
The Gyeongnam Highway Co., 
Ltd. (Changwon- Busan) 250,931 2013 22.50 30 
The Third Gyeongin Highway 
Co., Ltd. 695,432 2010 14.30 30 
 Mean 715,217 2009 20.47 29.63 
Source: PIMAC Infra info DB, www.dart.or.kr  
This analysis has been conducted using the SAS macros for BCC analysis 
developed by Ko (2017).  
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Among the 37 projects, published financial information for two could not be found, 
so 35 projects were included in actual analysis. 
1) Input Factors 
a) Operating Cost 
Overall, operating costs have increased as operation continued. Main roads have 
higher operating costs and larger variations by SPC (DMUs) than bridges/tunnels. 
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Figure 3 
Annual Operating Cost Trends by Project 
 
b) Amortization of Management and Operation Rights 
AMOR maintained a fairly constant level due to the fact that overall investment 
expenses were amortized using a straight-line method over the operating period. However, 
there were some cases where amortization of SPC suddenly increased due to an increase 
in management and operation rights. For example, GK Fixed Link Corp. (Busan-Geoje), 
in connection with one of the bridges/tunnels, had new investors who were willing to 
apply more input for less output due to a change in the macroeconomic environment, 
such as low interest rates. On the other hand, in the first year, amortization expense may 
be lower than during other operating years due to amortization on a monthly basis. 
  
(Mil. KRW) 
Operating Year 
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Figure 4 
Annual AMOR Trends by Project 
 
c) Interest Expense 
SPC of bridges/tunnels pay a certain amount of interest annually, while main roads 
were divided into projects with constant, increasing, or decreasing interest costs. If the 
repayment date of the principal of the debt has not yet arrived, interest should be paid 
steadily. Once the principal is repaid, interest costs will decrease. However, if interest 
costs are increasing, this can be a negative sign because the financial situation of SPC 
will become worse with additional borrowing. 
  
(Mil. KRW) 
Operating Year 
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Figure 5 
Annual Interest Expense Trends by Project
 
 
Of the 35 projects, four projects had three input factors included in the top five. 
Three projects (New Daegu Busan Expressway Co., Ltd.; New Airport Highway Co., Ltd. 
(Incheon); and Seoul Beltway Corp.) composed the main road group, and one (GK Fixed 
Link Corp. (Busan-Geoje)) represented the bridge/tunnel group. 
In the case of the New Daegu Busan Expressway Co., Ltd., road length was 82.1 
km, the longest among the 37 roads. The other two main roads were also relatively long; 
the length of New Airport Highway Co., Ltd. (Incheon) was 40.2 km, while Seoul 
Beltway Corp. was 36.3 km. The average length of the 37 roads was 19.1 km, with a 
standard deviation of 22.2. GK Fixed Link Corp. (Busan-Geoje) was only 8.2 km but was 
designed using a complex and expensive construction method, the “submerged tunnel 
method.” For the four road projects considered, the size of the project (including total 
investment cost, road length, and construction method) had an effect on input factors.  
On the other hand, there were four projects with all three input factors ranked in the 
lower five (Wonjecksan Tunnel Inc.; Mun Hack Development Co., Ltd. (Incheon); 
(Mil. KRW) 
Operating Year 
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Manwolsan Tunnel Co., Ltd. (Incheon); and Kwangju Ring Road Co., Ltd. (Section 3)). 
All four roads were fairly short: less than 4 km.  
Table 4 
Input Factor Descriptive Statistics 
 
N 
(operating 
years) 
Operating cost 
(Mil. KRW) AMOR (Mil. KRW) 
Interest expense 
(Mil. KRW) 
Mean 8.4 25,806 16,292 31,726 
Standard deviation 4.6 22,491 14,638 33,057 
Min 1 3,775 1,763 2,359 
Max 16 81,468 54,699 143,514 
Sample number 35 35 35 35 
 
Table 5 
Input Factor Descriptive Statistics by Project 
Type DMU_name N 
Operating cost 
(Mil. KRW) AMOR (Mil. KRW) 
Interest expense 
(Mil. KRW) 
Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. 
B
rid
ge
/T
un
ne
l 
Bukhang I'Bridge Co., Ltd. 
(Busan) 3 12,174 7,165 14,842 8,013 3,700 10,183 7,286 3,657 9,323 
Eulsukdo Bridge Co., Ltd. 
(Busan) 7 16,167 14,457 23,839 10,427 9,673 10,552 15,108 13,639 17,419 
GK Fixed Link Corp. (Busan-
Geoje) 6 58,439 50,987 67,880 38,280 34,519 42,041 67,814 62,115 77,448 
Ilsan Grand Bridge Corporation 9 8,832 6,259 10,289 5,459 3,586 5,694 16,181 9,849 18,343 
Incheon Bridge Co., Ltd. 8 40,871 16,350 46,121 24,382 6,698 26,939 44,181 11,437 58,217 
Machang Bridge Corp. 9 12,953 6,645 15,950 7,215 3,244 8,654 27,104 12,083 30,705 
Manwolsan Tunnel Co., Ltd. 
(Incheon) 12 6,081 2,681 10,290 3,373 1,186 6,390 5,169 1,464 7,406 
Mishiryung Area Development 
Co., Ltd. 11 6,809 4,357 8,656 3,614 1,903 3,788 13,011 3,969 17,748 
Mun Hack Development Co., 
Ltd. (Incheon) 15 5,499 1 11,446 3,993 2,499 9,201 4,544 1,982 6,946 
The Ulsan Harbour Bridge Co., 
Ltd. 2 12,142 9,451 14,833 8,260 6,087 10,434 10,688 7,822 13,553 
Wonjecksan Tunnel Inc. 13 3,775 1,928 6,338 1,763 760 3,331 2,359 1,050 3,742 
Woomyunsan Development Co., 
Ltd. (Tunnel) 13 9,914 8,875 12,369 5,601 5,334 8,479 9,457 6,727 12,331 
Yongma Tunnel Co., Ltd. 3 7,488 2,112 11,620 4,254 981 5,894 6,214 655 9,867 
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M
ai
n 
R
oa
d 
Busan Ulsan Expressway Co., 
Ltd. 8 51,573 49,695 53,573 30,711 30,705 30,718 58,256 56,278 59,263 
CheonanNonsan Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 14 62,854 54,563 71,415 36,852 36,700 36,999 83,324 57,217 104,668 
Daegu East Circulation Road 
Co., Ltd. 15 11,056 1,700 18,452 7,794 1,088 13,059 9,790 4,284 13,573 
Daegu South Circulation Road 
Corporation 4 16,630 10,323 18,981 10,593 6,637 11,919 12,187 7,388 14,664 
Daejeon Riverside Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 13 8,804 4,868 11,152 4,431 1,542 4,672 7,204 4,326 15,559 
Gwangju Belt-Highway Inc. 
(Section 4) 10 10,177 6,114 13,270 5,449 2,655 6,143 10,833 5,111 12,834 
Gyeonggi Highway Co., Ltd. 
(West Suwon- Pyeongtaek) 8 37,847 13,521 42,825 23,033 6,301 25,752 41,580 6,538 61,599 
GYEONGSU Highway Co., Ltd. 
(YongIn- Seoul) 8 29,268 18,940 32,480 17,499 9,333 18,665 42,134 20,075 48,631 
Kangnam Beltway Co., Ltd. 
(Seoul) 1 20,561 20,561 20,561 13,955 13,955 13,955 22,548 22,548 22,548 
Kwangju Ring Road Co., Ltd. 
(Section 3) 13 7,210 5,035 9,981 2,968 129 3,828 6,006 655 7,782 
Kwangju Ring Road Co., Ltd. 
(Section 1) 16 10,931 5,123 14,495 5,760 2,481 7,204 27,603 9,211 34,745 
Kyunggi South Road Co., Ltd. 4 23,030 19,793 26,663 11,970 11,164 12,297 24,515 20,638 27,003 
Metropolitan Western 
Expressway Co., Ltd. 1 32,634 32,634 32,634 24,044 24,044 24,044 37,386 37,386 37,386 
Namyangju Urban Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 6 11,296 7,398 16,129 6,760 2,533 7,621 13,913 4,882 16,465 
New Airport Highway Co., Ltd. 
(Incheon) 16 72,836 64,456 81,307 48,338 47,527 51,962 67,159 30,154 113,120 
New Daegu Busan Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 11 81,468 74,245 91,598 54,699 50,222 55,341 143,514 57,534 177,786 
Seoul Beltway Corp. 11 68,869 33,930 83,262 40,471 18,491 43,992 121,948 24,794 194,964 
Seoul-Chuncheon Highway Co., 
Ltd. 8 57,963 31,844 63,266 38,705 17,364 41,770 56,221 27,669 70,214 
The 2nd Seohaean Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 4 37,868 33,169 42,270 27,036 23,480 28,223 36,753 34,846 39,339 
The 2nd Youngdong Highway 
Co., Ltd. (Seoul-Wonju) 1 8,676 8,676 8,676 6,203 6,203 6,203 8,820 8,820 8,820 
The Gyeongnam Highway Co., 
Ltd. (Changwon- Busan) 4 11,175 3,121 17,444 7,059 1,300 11,063 8,372 1,110 13,977 
The Third Gyeongin Highway 
Co., Ltd. 7 29,325 15,820 33,621 21,250 9,659 23,183 41,247 13,546 55,910 
 
2) Output Factors 
a) Cash Flow from Operating Activities (CFOA) 
Projects in the bridge/tunnel group mostly revealed a constant cash flow, nearly or 
less than zero. The main roads group was more complex, with most projects showing 
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constant cash flow but larger standard deviation than the bridge/tunnel group. Some had 
an increasing cash flow, some decreasing. 
Figure 6 
CFOA Trends by Project 
 
b) Traffic Volume 
Traffic volume showed an upward trend overall. The main roads group had more 
traffic volume than the bridge/tunnel group.  
Figure 7 
Annual Traffic Volume Trends by Project 
 
 
(Mil. KRW) 
Operating Year 
(Mil. KRW) 
Operating Year 
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c)  Sales  
The sales factor also showed an upward trend. There were projects in both groups 
that demonstrated constant or increasing patterns. 
Figure 8 
Annual Sales Trends by Project 
 
The average of the three output factors for the main roads group was higher than for 
the bridge/tunnel group. The size of projects gave rise to this result: main roads were 
generally longer, causing higher tolls and greater traffic volume than for bridges/tunnels. 
Of the 35 projects, only one, New Airport Highway Co., Ltd. (Incheon), had three 
input factors included in the top five. This project also included the inputs in the top five.  
On the other hand, no project had all three input factors in the lower five. 
 
 
 
 
 
(Mil. KRW) 
Operating Year 
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Table 6 
Output Factor Descriptive Statistics 
 
N 
(operating 
years) 
Sales (Mil. KRW) Traffic volume (per day) CFOA (Mil. KRW) 
Mean 8.4 35,845 41,230 1,476 
Standard deviation 4.6 39,117 27,576 15,244 
Min 1 2,521 10,505 -24,582 
Max 16 130,660 129,160 48,427 
Sample number 35 35 35 35 
 
Table 7 
Output Factor Descriptive Statistics by Project 
Type DMU_name N 
Sales (Mil. KRW) Traffic volume (per day) CFOA (Mil. KRW) 
Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. 
B
rid
ge
/T
un
ne
l 
Bukhang I'Bridge Co., Ltd. 
(Busan) 3 10,237 3,252 16,544 25,937 19,153 35,536 (7,697) (11,973) (1,515) 
Eulsukdo Bridge Co., Ltd. 
(Busan) 7 12,467 7,840 15,309 27,673 17,622 34,773 (7,270) (17,422) (3,480) 
GK Fixed Link Corp. (Busan-
Geoje) 6 80,831 72,784 86,648 23,282 20,451 25,443 538 (50,297) 42,320 
Ilsan Grand Bridge Corporation 9 13,996 4,517 21,747 38,461 21,461 55,429 (3,949) (9,026) 7,174 
Incheon Bridge Co., Ltd. 8 58,790 9,166 92,792 32,013 25,086 44,561 7,145 (11,925) 33,900 
Machang Bridge Corp. 9 15,002 3,695 30,109 20,462 10,379 37,657 (14,173) (58,664) 1,275 
Manwolsan Tunnel Co., Ltd. 
(Incheon) 12 4,465 1,041 5,847 19,013 11,163 23,329 (3,531) (18,487) 4,646 
Mishiryung Area Development 
Co., Ltd. 11 11,206 3,777 17,381 10,505 3,500 15,429 (1,632) (4,550) 153 
Mun Hack Development Co., 
Ltd. (Incheon) 15 7,163 3,292 10,370 30,857 22,530 41,082 2,416 (6,967) 22,188 
The Ulsan Harbour Bridge Co., 
Ltd. 2 8,637 5,752 11,521 42,096 39,513 44,679 (5,832) (6,446) (5,218) 
Wonjecksan Tunnel Inc. 13 2,521 704 3,600 10,527 6,664 14,355 (1,487) (6,872) 2,813 
Woomyunsan Development Co., 
Ltd. (Tunnel) 13 16,328 8,690 23,430 23,144 13,886 29,500 3,909 (2,204) 16,213 
Yongma Tunnel Co., Ltd. 3 7,306 554 11,927 18,217 10,342 24,667 (1,107) (4,862) 1,885 
H
ig
hw
ay
 
Busan Ulsan Expressway Co., 
Ltd. 8 38,688 28,293 56,107 27,060 18,599 37,016 (13,415) (88,858) 8,215 
CheonanNonsan Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 14 112,591 55,817 170,727 37,126 21,859 51,599 28,854 (26,322) 66,589 
Daegu East Circulation Road 
Co., Ltd. 15 8,063 6,025 13,268 22,320 18,403 36,269 (3,350) (10,612) 9,785 
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Daegu South Circulation Road 
Corporation 4 11,700 4,589 17,257 28,630 19,630 37,008 (9,535) (21,933) (2,475) 
Daejeon Riverside Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 13 6,947 811 12,399 35,088 11,599 49,634 (2,809) (12,181) 20,125 
Gwangju Belt-Highway Inc. 
(Section 4) 10 16,798 5,001 23,482 53,017 32,869 67,198 1,744 (2,382) 6,160 
Gyeonggi Highway Co., Ltd. 
(West Suwon- Pyeongtaek) 8 48,203 4,470 68,785 34,749 14,269 50,697 (13,490) (72,815) 13,008 
GYEONGSU Highway Co., Ltd. 
(YongIn- Seoul) 8 40,907 11,521 55,329 69,476 39,005 93,327 1,877 (81,583) 93,811 
Kangnam Beltway Co., Ltd. 
(Seoul) 1 23,992 23,992 23,992 94,102 94,102 94,102 42,535 42,535 42,535 
Kwangju Ring Road Co., Ltd. 
(Section 3) 13 9,595 424 15,949 28,907 15,384 40,993 (143) (8,379) 4,664 
Kwangju Ring Road Co., Ltd. 
(Section 1) 16 13,849 9,212 19,132 37,720 28,057 49,320 (16,711) (84,282) 5,073 
Kyunggi South Road Co., Ltd. 4 33,779 28,516 38,312 129,160 121,269 135,550 (133) (3,139) 1,603 
Metropolitan Western 
Expressway Co., Ltd. 1 30,619 30,619 30,619 41,059 41,059 41,059 2,482 2,482 2,482 
Namyangju Urban Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 6 11,911 5,068 15,020 28,016 22,823 33,254 (8) (4,887) 5,269 
New Airport Highway Co., Ltd. 
(Incheon) 16 124,518 89,906 152,906 60,157 51,815 76,681 48,427 (11,034) 152,003 
New Daegu Busan Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 11 129,498 85,809 174,841 38,513 29,353 48,709 (24,582) (69,069) 8,190 
Seoul Beltway Corp. 11 130,660 19,328 211,025 80,074 34,575 121,300 (6,906) (44,252) 46,323 
Seoul-Chuncheon Highway Co., 
Ltd. 8 93,160 32,992 123,552 39,317 29,118 47,394 21,119 (19,184) 58,379 
The 2nd Seohaean Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 4 64,324 48,819 71,469 58,982 54,107 63,268 15,149 (8,052) 28,780 
The 2nd Youngdong Highway 
Co., Ltd. (Seoul-Wonju) 1 7,147 7,147 7,147 32,632 32,632 32,632 20,388 20,388 20,388 
The Gyeongnam Highway Co., 
Ltd. (Changwon- Busan) 4 7,845 953 16,001 25,374 15,188 43,934 (2,232) (6,919) 1,756 
The Third Gyeongin Highway 
Co., Ltd. 7 40,816 12,642 59,587 119,402 87,854 160,006 (4,944) (10,854) 198 
 
Ⅴ. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Analysis Results 
When selecting sample projects among the 35considered, a 2-year ramp-up period 
was excluded from analysis. Therefore, as of the end of 2016, four projects had operated 
for less than three years and were excluded (Kangnam Beltway Co., Ltd. (Seoul); 
Metropolitan Western Expressway Co., Ltd.; The 2nd Youngdong Highway Co., Ltd. 
(Seoul-Wonju); and The Ulsan Harbour Bridge Co., Ltd.). 
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1) Main Roads 
Kyunggi South Road Co., Ltd., was found to be the most efficient among the 19 
main road projects included, with an efficiency score of 1. This road project was only in 
its fourth year of operation but showed very high traffic volume. On the other hand, other 
input and output factors were assessed at a middle level. A low level of sales was 
observed, despite the traffic volume results, given low toll fees due to the refinancing of 
gain sharing. 
From a user's perspective, the low toll fee makes the facility accessible, and from 
an investor’s perspective, the project has been able to create a stable income—enough to 
repay principal and interest expenses while earning above expectations. In addition, from 
the government’s perspective, subsidies are not needed and lowering the toll was possible 
by refinancing gain sharing. Therefore, this project can be considered successful for all 
stakeholders. 
The second highest score was granted to Gwangju Belt-Highway Inc. (Section 4) 
(0.90); the third, New Airport Highway Co., Ltd. (Incheon) (0.84); and fourth, Seoul 
Beltway Corp. (0.84). These three projects showed high output. However, the input level 
of Gwangju Belt-Highway Inc. was low, while the input levels of New Airport Highway 
Co., Ltd. (Incheon) and Seoul Beltway Corp were high.  
Conversely, the projects with the lowest efficiency scores were Busan Ulsan 
Expressway Co., Ltd. (0.30); Daegu East Circulation Road Co., Ltd. (0.41); and Daegu 
South Circulation Road Corporation (0.42). These three were all outside the metropolitan 
area. Among these, Busan Ulsan Expressway Co., Ltd., required high input but had low 
traffic volume and cash flow. 
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Table 8 
Annual Efficiency Score Results by Project (Main Roads) 
DMU_name/year 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Mean CA GR Rank  
Busan Ulsan Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.43         0.30 12% 19 
CheonanNonsan 
Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.52 0.59 0.69 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.85 0.97 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.96 1.00   0.81 6% 6 
Daegu East Circulation 
Road Co., Ltd. 0.60 0.36 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.35 0.31 1.00 0.31 0.35 0.36 0.43   0.41 -2% 18 
Daegu South Circulation 
Road Corporation 0.37 0.46              0.42 12% 17 
Daejeon Riverside 
Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.53 0.61 0.57 0.61 0.72 0.76 0.80 1.00 0.88 0.98 1.00     0.77 6% 8 
Gwangju Belt-Highway 
Inc. (Section 4) 0.77 0.88 1.00 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.94 1.00        0.90 3% 2 
Gyeonggi Highway Co., 
Ltd. (West Suwon- 
Pyeongtaek) 
0.45 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.68          0.57 7% 14 
GYEONGSU Highway Co., 
Ltd. (YongIn- Seoul) 0.56 0.61 0.68 0.72 0.78 0.80          0.69 6% 11 
Kwangju Ring Road Co., 
Ltd. (Section 3) 0.44 0.50 0.57 0.65 0.76 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.96 1.00     0.75 8% 9 
Kwangju Ring Road Co., 
Ltd. (Section 1) 1.00 0.71 0.58 0.55 0.52 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.57 0.61 0.63 0.58 -3% 13 
Kyunggi South Road Co., 
Ltd.  1.00 1.00              1.00 - 1 
Namyangju Urban 
Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.37 0.39 0.49 0.57            0.45 11% 15 
New Airport Highway Co., 
Ltd. (Incheon) 0.61 1.00 0.91 0.97 0.86 0.82 0.73 0.65 0.66 0.74 0.78 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 4% 3 
New Daegu Busan 
Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.56 0.56 0.60 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.76       0.65 4% 12 
Seoul Beltway Corp. 0.58 0.75 0.95 0.81 0.77 0.85 0.91 0.92 1.00       0.84 6% 4 
Seoul-Chuncheon Highway 
Co., Ltd. 0.59 0.64 0.69 0.74 0.86 0.97          0.75 9% 10 
The 2nd Seohaean 
Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.84 0.75              0.80 -5% 7 
The Gyeongnam Highway 
Co., Ltd. (Changwon- 
Busan) 
0.39 0.48              0.43 12% 16 
The Third Gyeongin 
Highway Co., Ltd. 0.68 0.69 0.81 0.87 1.00           0.81 8% 5 
Mean 0.58 0.62 0.65 0.65 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.77 0.83 0.74 0.75 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.81  5%  
 
2) Bridges/Tunnels 
In total, 12 projects in the bridges/tunnels group were analyzed. Unlike main roads, 
the longer these projects had been operating, the more likely their efficiency score was to 
increase. The most efficient project was Woomyunsan Development Co., Ltd. (tunnel), 
with 0.84. This project had been in operation for 13 years as of 2016. At the beginning, 
its efficiency score was low, but it increased gradually. The improvement of sales and 
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decrease of interest expenses annually had a positive effect on its efficiency score. The 
input levels for the project were ranked in the middle, but sales and cash flow as output 
factors were at a high level with middle traffic volume.  
The second highest score went to Mun Hack Development Co., Ltd. (Incheon) 
(0.81); and the third, Mishiryung Area Development Co., Ltd. (0.80). These two projects 
had low input, and more than one input factor was relatively high. 
In contrast, the projects with the lowest efficiency scores were Eulsukdo Bridge Co., 
Ltd. (Busan) (0.35); Machang Bridge Corp. (0.54); and Bukhang I'Bridge Co., Ltd. 
(Busan) (0.51). Three of these were outside the Seoul metropolitan area and had lower 
output levels given their input.  
Table 9 
Annual Efficiency Score Results by Project (Bridges/Tunnels) 
DMU name/year 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Mean CA GR Rank 
Bukhang I'Bridge Co., 
Ltd. (Busan) 0.51             0.51 - 11 
Eulsukdo Bridge Co., Ltd. 
(Busan) 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.39         0.35 5% 12 
GK Fixed Link Corp. 
(Busan-Geoje) 1.00 0.69 0.65 0.69          0.76 -9% 6 
Ilsan Grand Bridge 
Corporation 0.58 0.66 0.66 0.75 0.82 0.90 1.00       0.77 8% 5 
Incheon Bridge Co., Ltd. 0.56 0.58 0.65 0.73 0.82 1.00        0.72 10% 7 
Machang Bridge Corp. 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.61 0.76 0.89       0.54 14% 10 
Manwolsan Tunnel Co., 
Ltd. (Incheon) 0.80 0.59 0.64 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.71 0.48 0.32 0.34    0.60 -8% 8 
Mishiryung Area 
Development Co., Ltd. 0.59 0.61 0.70 0.77 0.82 0.87 0.88 0.95 1.00     0.80 6% 3 
Mun Hack Development 
Co., Ltd. 
(Incheon) 
0.60 0.60 0.67 0.74 0.69 0.81 0.90 0.88 0.92 0.95 1.00 0.73 1.00 0.81 4% 2 
Wonjecksan Tunnel Inc. 0.93 1.00 0.72 0.74 0.79 0.83 0.88 1.00 0.83 0.43 0.41   0.78 -7% 4 
Woomyunsan 
Development Co., Ltd. 
(Tunnel) 
1.00 0.62 0.65 0.69 0.76 0.78 0.87 0.90 0.94 1.00 1.00   0.84 0% 1 
Yongma Tunnel Co., Ltd. 0.55             0.55 - 9 
Mean 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.66 0.71 0.83 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.68 0.80 0.73 1.00  2%  
 
Projects with high efficiency scores were characterized by medium input levels and 
more than one item with a high output level. 
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3) T-test 
a) Seoul Metropolitan Areas vs. Non-Seoul Metropolitan Areas 
In the first hypothesis, it was predicted that Seoul metropolitan area projects would 
be more efficient than those in non-Seoul metropolitan areas. This hypothesis was based 
on the expectation that there would be more users for facilities near Seoul and that traffic 
volume and profit would be guaranteed, to some extent. 
As a result of the t-test, the average value of efficiency in the Seoul metropolitan 
area was higher and significant at a 95% confidence level. Variance for the metropolitan 
area was narrower, and non-metropolitan areas had a larger deviation between projects. 
Table 10 
T-test Results (Metropolitan Areas vs. Non-metropolitan Areas) 
 Seoul metropolitan 
Non-Seoul 
metropolitan 
Mean 0.747579102 0.614784512 
Variance 0.020245549 0.033713533 
Observations 13 18 
Df 29 
t stat 2.174908496 
P(T ≤ t) two-tail 0.037935292 
t critical two-tail 2.045229642 
b) Bridges/Tunnels vs. Main Roads  
The second hypothesis anticipated that main road projects would be more efficient 
than tunnels/bridges. This hypothesis drew from the expectation that tunnels and bridges 
would require more construction costs per km. 
As a result of the t-test, the average value of efficiency for main roads was higher 
but not significant at a 95% confidence level.  
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Table 11 
T-test Results (Main Roads vs. Bridges/Tunnels) 
 Main roads Bridges/tunnels 
Mean 0.629724562 0.545469724 
Variance 0.046694181 0.01837692 
Observations 19 12 
Df 29 
t stat 1.20507186 
P(T ≤ t) two-tail 0.237917553 
t critical two-tail 2.045229642 
 
C) MRG vs. Non-MRG 
To determine if MRGs actually affected efficiency scores, cases with and without 
MRGs were compared. This analysis was based on efficiency scores calculated by 
distinguishing bridges/tunnels from main roads. If the ratio of MRG to sales was high, 
efficiency scores increased. If MRGs were received, efficiency scores decreased given a 
ratio of sales less than 30-40%. 
Table 12 
Efficiency Scores (Including MRGs vs. Excluding MRGs) 
DMU name MRG ratio to sales 
Efficiency 
score 
(including 
MRG)(A) 
Efficiency 
score 
(Excluding 
MRG)(B) 
B-A 
Wonjecksan Tunnel Inc. 119.31% 0.78 0.82 0.045 
Manwolsan Tunnel Co., Ltd. (Incheon) 86.50% 0.60 0.65 0.049 
Machang Bridge Corp. 61.53% 0.54 0.64 0.099 
Bukhang I'Bridge Co., Ltd. (Busan) 45.09% 0.51 0.74 0.229 
MunHack Development Co., Ltd. (Incheon) 33.94% 0.81 0.86 0.057 
Ilsan Grand Bridge Corporation 25.75% 0.77 0.76 -0.008 
GK Fixed Link Corp. (Busan-Geoje) 24.86% 0.76 0.93 0.169 
Mishiryung Area Development Co., Ltd. 19.36% 0.80 0.67 -0.134 
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Woomyunsan Development Co., Ltd. (Tunnel) 19.31% 0.84 0.82 -0.019 
Eulsukdo Bridge Co., Ltd. (Busan) 14.43% 0.35 0.31 -0.040 
Incheon Bridge Co., Ltd. 14.29% 0.72 0.75 0.029 
Yongma Tunnel Co., Ltd. 0.00% 0.55 0.42 -0.133 
Daegu East Circulation Road Co., Ltd. 92.13% 0.41 0.52 0.107 
Kwangju Ring Road Co., Ltd. (Section1) 77.28% 0.58 0.63 0.059 
Kwangju Ring Road Co., Ltd. (Section3) 50.12% 0.75 0.82 0.065 
New Airport Highway Co., Ltd. (Incheon) 45.96% 0.84 0.85 0.010 
Daejeon Riverside Expressway Co., Ltd. 45.54% 0.77 0.79 0.019 
New Daegu Busan Expressway Co., Ltd. 44.00% 0.65 0.66 0.012 
CheonanNonsan Expressway Co., Ltd. 30.64% 0.81 0.68 -0.123 
Seoul Beltway Corp. 17.16% 0.84 0.66 -0.175 
Seoul-Chuncheon Highway Co., Ltd. 8.56% 0.75 0.46 -0.292 
The Third Gyeongin Highway Co., Ltd. 7.80% 0.81 0.78 -0.029 
Gyeonggi Highway Co., Ltd. (West Suwon-
Pyeongtaek) 4.12% 0.57 0.33 -0.237 
Gwangju Belt-Highway Inc. (Section 4) 3.92% 0.90 0.89 -0.007 
GYEONGSU Highway Co., Ltd. (YongIn-
Seoul) 1.55% 0.69 0.48 -0.213 
Kyunggi South Road Co., Ltd. 0.00% 1.00 1.00 - 
The2nd Seohaean Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.00% 0.80 0.52 -0.277 
Namyangju Urban Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.00% 0.45 0.39 -0.060 
The Gyeongnam Highway Co., Ltd. (Changwon-
Busan) 0.00% 0.43 0.40 -0.036 
Daegu South Circulation Road Corporation 0.00% 0.42 0.35 -0.063 
Busan Ulsan Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.00% 0.30 0.18 -0.120 
 
Additional t-tests were conducted to determine the characteristics of groups with 
high efficiency scores, including whether they had funds from financial investors, 
whether they were circulation roads in the city or outside, and whether they had operated 
for more than 10 years. 
In this case, only operation period affected efficiency scores. Groups in operation 
for more than 10 years showed a higher average score (0.74) than other groups (0.60), 
with these scores significant at a 95% confidence level. 
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4) CAGR 
On the other hand, since this analysis used time series data, additional examination 
of the Compound Annual Rate of Growth (CARG) is possible. The CARG of each 
project provides meaningful information if improvement has taken place from the 
beginning to the present. CARG was calculated using 3rd year efficiency scores and 2016 
efficiency scores. 
For the main roads group, projects with low average efficiency scores operating for 
less than 10 years returned a higher CARG: Namyangju Urban Expressway Co., Ltd.; 
The Gyeongnam Highway Co., Ltd. (Changwon- Busan); and Busan Ulsan Expressway 
Co., Ltd. 
Three projects showed negative growth rates (Kwangju Ring Road Co., Ltd. 
(Section 1); the 2nd Seohaean Expressway Co., Ltd.; and Daegu East Circulation Road 
Co., Ltd.). 
Table 13 
CARG for Efficiency Scores by Project (Main Roads) 
DMU name 
Efficiency 
score in 
3rd year 
Efficiency 
score in 
2016 
Mean 
Operating 
years by 
2016 
CAGR 
Kyunggi South Road Co., Ltd.  1.00 1.00 1.00 4 - 
Gwangju Belt-Highway Inc. (Section 4) 0.77 1.00 0.90 10 3% 
New Airport Highway Co., Ltd. (Incheon) 0.61 1.00 0.84 16 4% 
Seoul Beltway Corp. 0.58 1.00 0.84 11 6% 
The Third Gyeongin Highway Co., Ltd. 0.68 1.00 0.81 7 8% 
CheonanNonsan Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.52 1.00 0.81 14 6% 
The 2nd Seohaean Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.84 0.75 0.80 4 -5% 
Daejeon Riverside Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.53 1.00 0.77 13 6% 
Kwangju Ring Road Co., Ltd. (Section 3) 0.44 1.00 0.75 13 8% 
Seoul-Chuncheon Highway Co., Ltd. 0.59 0.97 0.75 8 9% 
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GYEONGSU Highway Co., Ltd. (YongIn- 
Seoul) 0.56 0.80 0.69 8 6% 
New Daegu Busan Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.56 0.76 0.65 11 4% 
Kwangju Ring Road Co., Ltd. (Section 1) 1.00 0.63 0.58 16 -3% 
Gyeonggi Highway Co., Ltd. (West Suwon- 
Pyeongtaek) 0.45 0.68 0.57 8 7% 
Namyangju Urban Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.37 0.57 0.45 6 11% 
The Gyeongnam Highway Co., Ltd. (Changwon- 
Busan) 0.39 0.48 0.43 4 12% 
Daegu South Circulation Road Corporation 0.37 0.46 0.42 4 12% 
Daegu East Circulation Road Co., Ltd. 0.60 0.43 0.41 15 -2% 
Busan Ulsan Expressway Co., Ltd. 0.22 0.43 0.30 8 12% 
 
Meanwhile, the main roads group indicated a mostly upward trend, while the 
bridges/tunnels group could be divided into three categories: high growth (8-14%), 
medium growth (4-6%), and negative growth (-7-9%). 
Table 14 
CARG for Efficiency Scores by Project (Bridges/Tunnels) 
DMU name 
Efficiency 
score in 
3rd year 
Efficiency 
score in 
last year 
average 
Operating 
years by 
2016 
CAGR 
Woomyunsan Development Co., Ltd. 
(Tunnel) 1.00 1.00 0.84 13 0% 
Mun Hack Development Co., Ltd. (Incheon) 0.60 1.00 0.81 15 4% 
Mishiryung Area Development Co., Ltd. 0.59 1.00 0.80 11 6% 
Wonjecksan Tunnel Inc. 0.93 0.41 0.78 13 -7% 
Ilsan Grand Bridge Corporation 0.58 1.00 0.77 9 8% 
GK Fixed Link Corp. (Busan-Geoje) 1.00 0.69 0.76 6 -9% 
Incheon Bridge Co., Ltd. 0.56 1.00 0.72 8 10% 
Manwolsan Tunnel Co., Ltd. (Incheon) 0.80 0.34 0.60 12 -8% 
Machang Bridge Corp. 0.35 0.89 0.54 9 14% 
Eulsukdo Bridge Co., Ltd. (Busan) 0.31 0.39 0.35 7 5% 
 
Ⅵ. Conclusion 
6.1 Summary and Conclusions 
40 
 
The PPP market in the Republic of Korea has grown and developed into a stable 
and profitable financial market as a result of the government’s systemic support and 
management (Kim et al., 2011). However, both negative and positive evaluations of the 
PPP system and market remain. At this point, addressing the current system to evaluate 
factors that contribute to the success or failure of projects is useful to inform effective 
future policy to improve the PPP system and market. 
In preparation for this paper, a quantitative study was carried out using DEA from a 
financial perspective, assessing PPP road projects in the Republic of Korea in order to 
formulate practical, applicable implications for PPP policy. DEA enables the 
measurement of relative efficiency by estimating the producible set and boundary based 
on input and output data for each DMU when multiple input and output factors are 
involved. The resulting analysis provides direction as to how resources should be reduced 
or increased to enable better efficiency. When deciding on input and output factors, 
essential perspectives on PPP projects as not only infrastructure for the public but also PF 
were considered. The capacity of PF projects to generate cash is very important and 
should be sufficient to repay investors’ principal and interest expenses. In this research, 
three input and three output factors were investigated: the input factors were operating 
cost, AMOR, and interest expense, while the output factors were CFOA, traffic volume, 
and sales. 
Since PPP road projects represent more than half of the PPP market in the Republic 
of Korea, PPP road projects, especially those in operation for more than 3 years as of the 
end of 2016, were chosen for analysis. Samples included 13 tunnels and bridges, and 22 
main roads. Roads composed of only tunnels and bridges were separated into different 
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groups because of differences with general roads, such as road length and construction 
costs. 
As a result of efficiency analysis using panel data, Kyunggi South Road Co., Ltd., 
was determined to be the most efficient among the 19 main road projects, with an 
efficiency score of 1. Woomyunsan Development Co., Ltd. (tunnel), from the group of 12 
bridges/tunnels was assigned a score of 0.84. Unlike for the main road group, the longer 
they had operated, the more likely bridges/tunnels were to see an increased score. 
Projects with high efficiency scores had several attributes in common, e.g., a medium 
input level with more than one output of a high level. In addition, projects in the Seoul 
metropolitan area or receiving a higher ratio of MRG to sales tended to have higher 
efficiency scores. 
This assessment offers clues regarding factors behind success and failure, yielding 
useful insights for future PPP policies. However, there are several limitations to this 
study. First, while focusing on financial aspects, input and output factors related to 
operational services such as accident handling speed, number of accidents, and 
satisfaction of users could not be considered. Second, although roads are main projects in 
the PPP market of the Republic of Korea, other project types such as railroads and ports 
should also be analyzed in further studies. 
6.2 Policy Implications 
First of all, the government should conduct feasibility studies more carefully and 
thoroughly, especially focusing on traffic volume estimation, before proceeding with new 
projects in local areas or non-Seoul metropolitan areas. As a result of a t-test, the average 
value of efficiency in the Seoul metropolitan area was found to be higher and significant 
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at a 95% confidence level. Variance for metropolitan areas was narrower, and non-
metropolitan areas had larger deviation between projects. This finding was highly 
influenced by demand estimation, rather than estimations for cost of construction or 
operation. It turned out that the lower efficiency scores for most projects in non-
metropolitan areas indicated larger gaps between estimations for traffic volume and real 
traffic conditions, giving relatively lower mean of sales and CFOA than expected.  
However, since estimating future profit and cost accurately is hardly possible, 
institutional devices and strategies are essential, highlighting the importance of such 
measures as periodically monitoring demand and tightening up internal supervision by 
the authority in charge. Under the current system, the estimated cost of projects tends to 
be adjusted to real cost, but estimated demand is maintained. However, by monitoring the 
demand gap between estimated values and real figures, the motivation to overestimate 
demand to enhance project feasibility will decrease if the private sector project 
representatives who overestimated the demand incur a penalty. Also, rigid internal 
supervision could decrease the likelihood of projects being carried out indiscriminately 
by public officials in charge.  
Moreover, if government guarantees or subsidies are expected, incentive for the 
private sector to overestimate demand is generated. Based on a comparison of results for 
projects with and without MRG, higher MRG to sales ratios implied higher efficiency 
scores. This suggests projects with MRG received higher scores due not to efficiency but 
MRG itself. Therefore, the government would do well to reduce the burden of MRG 
payments by increasing SPCs’ sales. Conscientiously managing MRGs so as to prevent 
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moral hazards and motivate creation and efficiency for increasing sales from the private 
sector is the government’s duty. 
The government has been making an effort to reduce the fiscal burden by altering 
the subsidy payment mechanism from MRG to MCC. This attempt is encouraging as an 
indication of effort to pursue satisfying results for the government, new investors, and 
existing investors. Further measures are still needed to address the more involved issues 
identified above, however, and the understanding of the challenges to improving PPP 
efficiency as clarified through this study should be taken as grounds to consider policy 
initiatives related to more accurate estimation and diligent project oversight. 
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